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Abstract
We argue that complex models with many parameters do not allow to
infer about cause and effect.
1 Classical, discrete, yet unpredictable?
Applications of computational models to social phenomena met a range of obsta-
cles of different nature and level, from unrepeatability of experiments to lack of
interest of social scientists. An objection which is particularly grave states that
the concept of determinism - theory that all events, including moral choices, are
completely determined by previously existing causes [1] - fails in social sciences.
This objection seems to be grounded on both experimental and moral premises.
Namely, our free will is confirmed by our everyday experience and by our moral
norms on responsibility for our actions. What, if it appears to be precluded by
a deterministic law? In this sense our free will is incompatible with determinism
of scientific results on human behaviour.
Discussions on freedom of a human being can be traced back to ancient
Stoics, but it was not until XIX century when they have been sharpened by
the formulation of sociological laws by Auguste Comte. Modern physics added
some arguments to this discussion, based on the Heisenberg principle of uncer-
tainty and on the concept of deterministic chaos [2]. However, as it was rightly
pointed out by W ladys law Tatarkiewicz [3], indeterminism in physics deals with
our inability to determine future states, and not with lack of cause and effect
in Nature. Even more, how this indetermism could be overcame by a conscious
decision of mind? This question is equivalent to looking for entirely new physics;
in fact, the connection of consciousness with quantum mechanics has been ex-
plored by Roger Penrose [4].
We note here that the above problem of incompatibility is cured only seem-
ingly by a reference to the law of large numbers, as in [5]; if people decide
according to their free will, how the average over these decisions could be de-
termined by a deterministic law? In this case, an accordance of model results
with real data should be taken as only fortuitous. The assumption of the free
will is, however, hard to justify a priori. On the other hand, much effort has
been done to look for deterministic laws in human behavior [6]; any success,
fortuitous or more than that, is perhaps the best thing we can have. For sure,
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111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Table 1: The rule of automaton 11110000 = 240. In the upper line, the list is
given of all possible states of three cells. In the bottom line, the resulting state
of the central cell is given under each state of three cells. The bottom line can
be read as a number 11110000, what is equal to 240 when translated from the
binary to the decimal system. This particular rule means that the central cell
at time t+ 1 is equal to the state of its left neighbour at time t.
we cannot criticize such approaches until somebody offers a better insight.
Both quantum uncertainty and chaotic instabilities are known to produce
unpredictable behaviour. Here we are going to move back to third cause of in-
determinism, which is present without the former two. The third agent, histor-
ically the first, is the influence of an environment. To investigate this influence,
we should use a classical (non quantum) model and we should exclude chaotic
effects. The latter condition can be met by using the formalism of cellular au-
tomata, where time, space and states are discrete [7, 8]. We are going to discuss
limitations of concepts of cause and effect in a system described by discrete
variables.
2 Many causes
Let us start from an elementary cellular automaton [7] where cells form a linear
chain. There are two states of each cell, say 0 and 1. The neighborhood radius
is 1; therefore the state of a cell at time t + 1 depends on the states of this
cell and its two neighbours at time t. As we know, there is 256 elementary
automata; they can be conveniently numbered as the automaton rule written in
the decimal system [7].
Let us consider an automaton 11110000. It is equivalent to the rule, where
the state of a cell at time t+ 1 is the same as the state of its left neighbour at
time t. This is explained in detail in Table 1. In this rule, cause and effect can
be identified very clearly. The cause is the previous state of the left neighbour.
The effect is the actual state of the central cell.
To give an example of this rule, let us assume that some group of gentle-
men established a political club with an old-style sitting room. There, they are
sitting around a table in always the same order: A has Z at left hand and B
at right, B has A at left and C at right and so on. The rule is that at each
national presidential elections, each club member votes in the same way as his
left neighbour voted in the preceding elections: for Democrats or Republicans.
Now let us consider another rule 10010110 = 150, shown in Table 2. In this
case, a change of state of each cell at time t leads to a change of state of the cen-
tral cell at time t+1. There is no single cell which could be identified as a cause
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111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Table 2: The rule of automaton 10010110 = 150. The rule is designed in the
way that a change of state of each cell at time t leads to a change of state of
the central cell at time t+ 1.
of the central cell. The state of the central cell depends on the previous state of
all three cells. This rule is crucial for our argumentation here. Obviously, there
are many causes which lead to the effect. Keeping our previous example of the
political club, it would be not easy for a club member to answer the question:
why did you vote to Democrats?
Yet, our rule 150 is simple enough to find another cause than the state of
one cell. Namely, it is the number of zeros in the row of three cells at time t. If
this number is even, the outcome is zero; otherwise it is 1. However, when the
neighborhood radius is as large as the system size, the problem to find a simple
cause for a given rule has no general solution; in most cases, there are multiple
causes.
To visualise the difficulty, we can imagine a large club with a hundred or
more members sitting together. Suppose that each person has his own rule to
determine how to vote during next elections. Each personal rule can be different
and its outcome can depend of a different and large subset of club members.
For simplicity, we can assume that the rules do not change in time. Still, the
task how to find the rules from the complete data on individual voting is com-
putationally hard and it cannot be accomplished in a reasonable time. This
means that we cannot predict the outcome of a next election on the basis of ob-
servation. The problem is deterministic per se, but the rule remains unknown.
Even the deterministic character of the problem can be hard to verify. This is
because the number of states increases exponentially with the system size, rep-
resented here by the number of club members. The criterion of the deterministic
character could be if two identical states a times t and t′ produce two identical
outcomes at t+1 and t′ +1. The devil is in that the time of experiment should
be long enough to observe such coincidence of states: in general, the difference
t
′
− t also increases exponentially with the system size.
3 Conclusions on modeling
Suppose that we intend to build a realistic model of a social system, with the
purpose to reproduce observed facts. On the contrary to a mathematical pen-
dulum, a social system cannot be introduced to a computer as a whole; some
amount of reductionism is always necessary. This means that we never know
everything on a social system. Still, we are often tempted to capture more and
more details. The problem is not to lose control of our model. The purpose
of modeling is to obtain relations ’cause-effect’. In social systems, presumably
an effect has multiple causes. A given value of each parameter can be a cause.
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Then, unless the values of the model parameters are either taken directly from
other experiments, they should be varied to check the result. However, if the
number of parameters is too large, this procedure cannot be accomplished. This
means that in complex models the concepts of cause and effect do not work. In
this way, determinism fails for purely computational reasons.
This argument allows to state that complex models with many parameters
are not useful. Even if an accordance of the model result with reality is obtained,
it is likely that one can obtain different results, including those contradict to
reality, when the parameters are changed. If this is not the case, some param-
eters are irrelevant and they should be removed from the model. With many
parameters to handle, even the latter possibility cannot be verified.
It is worthwhile to note that the above argumentation is by no means a
support for the concept of free will. The relation of social scientists to this con-
cept is twofold. As human beings, we believe that free will is indispensable for
moral reasons; as a cultural achievement of human race it is a social good of the
highest value. As scientists, we doubt if we can prove its existence and we are
deeply interested in identification of situations where free will is limited. Above
we argued that if in our decisions we are just complex deterministic machines,
it is likely that we cannot recognize this.
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